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Abstract
We compare the performance of two popular iterative algorithms, fictitious play and counterfactual
regret minimization, in approximating Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. Despite recent success
of counterfactual regret minimization in multiplayer poker and conjectures of its superiority, we show
that fictitious play leads to improved Nash equilibrium approximation with statistical significance over a
variety of game classes and sizes.
1 Introduction
In two-player zero-sum games a Nash equilibrium strategy is guaranteed to win (or tie) in expectation against
any opposing strategy by the minimax theorem. In games with more than two players there can be multiple
equilibria with different values to the players, and following one has no performance guarantee; however, it
was shown that a Nash equilibrium strategy defeated a variety of agents submitted for a class project in a
3-player imperfect-information game, Kuhn poker [14]. This demonstrates that Nash equilibrium strategies
can be successful in practice despite the fact that they do not have a performance guarantee.
While Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time for two-player zero-sum games, it is
PPAD-hard to compute for non-zero-sum and games with 3 or more agents and widely believed that no
efficient algorithms exist [9, 10]. Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is an iterative self-play proce-
dure that has been proven to converge to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum [30]. It has been utilized
by superhuman agents in two-player poker, first for limit [3] and then for no-limit [24, 6]. It can also be
run in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games, but has no significant theoretical guarantees for these settings.
It was demonstrated that it does in fact converge to an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (a strategy profile in which
no player can gain more than ǫ by deviating) in three-player Kuhn poker, while it does not converge to
equilibrium in the larger game of three-player Leduc hold ’em [1]. It was subsequently proven that CFR
guarantees that no weight is put on iteratively strictly-dominated strategies or actions [18]. While for some
small games this guarantee can be very useful (e.g., for two-player Kuhn poker a high fraction of the actions
are iteratively-dominated), in most realistic games (such as Texas hold ’em) only a very small fraction of
actions are iteratively-dominated, and the guarantee is not useful [12]. Despite a lack of a significant theoret-
ical guarantee, CFR was combined with subgame solving [17] and depth-limited search [8, 22] to produce
a superhuman agent for multiplayer poker [7].
Fictitious play (FP) is another iterative algorithm that has been demonstrated to converge to Nash equi-
librium in two-player zero-sum games (and in certain other game classes), though not in general for multi-
player or non-zero-sum games [4, 29]. While it is not guaranteed to converge in multiplayer games, it has
been proven that if it does converge, then the average of the strategies played throughout the iterations con-
stitute an equilibrium [11]. Fictitious play has been successfully applied to approximate Nash equilibrium
strategies in a 3-player poker tournament to a small degree of approximation error [15, 16]. More recently
fictitious play has also been used to approximate equilibrium strategies in multiplayer auction [27, 28] and
national security [13] scenarios.
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Both counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play can be integrated with Monte Carlo sampling
to enable scalability in large imperfect-information games [23, 20]. Recently both approaches have also been
integrated with deep reinforcement learning to obtain strong performance in forms of poker [21, 5]. These
two approaches were compared in a simplified version of two-player poker called flop hold ’em poker as
well as 2-player limit Texas hold ’em, and Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization [5] was shown to
outperform Neural Fictitious Self Play [21]. It was concluded from these results that “Fictitious Play has
weaker theoretical convergence guarantees than CFR, and in practice converges slower.” [5] However, this
claim is just made based off the performance of specific integrations of CFR and FP with deep reinforcement
learning on two-player zero-sum poker variants. The conclusion does not necessarily generalize to other
versions of the algorithms, to other games, or to performance in multiplayer games (where neither approach
guarantees convergence).
In this paper we compare the performance of the core versions of the counterfactual regret minimization
and fictitious play algorithms for a variety of numbers of players and strategies.
2 Fictitious Play and Counterfactual Regret Minimization
A strategic-form game consists of a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a finite set of pure strategies Si
for each player i, and a real-valued utility for each player for each strategy vector (aka strategy profile),
ui : ×iSi → R. For simplicity we will assume that all players have the same number of pure strategies,
|Si| = m for all i. A two-player game is called zero sum if the sum of the payoffs for all strategy profiles
equals zero, i.e., u1(s1, s2) + u2(s1, s2) = 0 for all s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2. If this sum is always equal to
some constant c as opposed to zero then the game is called constant sum. Games that are constant sum are
strategically equivalent to zero-sum games, and all results from zero-sum games (e.g., minimax theorem and
convergence of CFR and FP) also hold for constant-sum games.
A mixed strategy σi for player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies, where σi(si′) is the
probability that player i plays si′ ∈ Si under σi. Let Σi denote the full set of mixed strategies for player
i. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium if ui(σ
∗
i
, σ∗
−i
) ≥ ui(σi, σ
∗
−i
) for all σi ∈ Σi
for all i ∈ N , where σ∗
−i
denotes the vector of the components of strategy σ∗ for all players excluding i. It
is well known that a Nash equilibrium exists in all finite games [25]. In practice all that we can hope for is
convergence of iterative algorithms to an approximation of Nash equilibrium. For a given candidate strategy
profile σ∗, define ǫ(σ∗) = maximaxσi∈Σi
[
ui(σi, σ
∗
−i
)− ui(σ
∗
i
, σ∗
−i
)
]
. The goal is to compute a strategy
profile σ∗ with as small a value of ǫ as possible (i.e., ǫ = 0 would indicate that σ∗ comprises an exact Nash
equilibrium). We say that a strategy profile σ∗ with value ǫ constitutes an ǫ-equilibrium. For two-player
zero-sum games, there are algorithms with bounds on the value of ǫ as a function of the number of iterations
and game size, and for different variations ǫ is proven to approach zero in the limit at different worst-case
rates (e.g., [19]).
In fictitious play, each player plays a best response to the average strategies of his opponents thus far.
Strategies are initialized arbitrarily at t = 1 (for our experiments we will initialize them to be uniformly
random). Then each player uses the following rule to obtain the average strategy at time t:
σti =
(
1−
1
t
)
σt−1
i
+
1
t
σ′ti ,
where σ′t
i
is a best response of player i to the profile σt−1
−i
of the other players played at time t−1. Thus, the
final strategy after T iterations σT is the average of the strategies played in the individual iterations (while
the best response σ′t
i
is the strategy actually played at iteration t).
For the core version of counterfactual regret minimization, we first compute the regret for not playing
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each pure strategy si as opposed to following strategy σ
t. This is defined as
rt(si) = ui(si, σ
t
−i)− ui(σ
t
i , σ
t
−i).
The regret for si at iteration T is then defined asR
T (si) =
∑
T
t=1
rt(si).DefineR
T
+(si) = max{R
T (si), 0}.
Initial strategies σ1 are uniform random, as for fictitious play. Then, in the core version of CFR strategies
are selected according to the regret matching rule:
σt+1(si) =
RT+(si)∑
s′
i
∈Si
RT+(s
′
i
)
.
If the denominator
∑
s′
i
∈Si
RT+(s
′
i
) equals zero then we assign each pure strategy with equal probability. As
for fictitious play, the average of the strategies played over the T iterations is the final output.
3 Experiments
We ran experiments with the core versions of fictitious play and counterfactual regret minimization on
uniform-random games for a variety of number of players n and number of pure strategies m. We consider
n = 2, 3, 4, 5 and m = 3, 5, 10. For each setting of n and m we randomly generated 10,000 games with
all payoffs chosen uniformly random in [0,1]. For each game, we ran both algorithms for 10,000 iterations
(except for the largest game n = 5, m = 10 we used 1,000 iterations). For n = 2 we also experimented on
zero-sum games where player 1’s payoff is selected uniformly in [0,1] and player 2’s payoff equals 1 minus
player 1’s payoff. For each game, we computed the degree of Nash equilibrium approximation ǫ by the two
algorithms, as well as the difference between the values of ǫ. We compute the 95% confidence interval for
the ǫ differences. If statistical significance was not obtained after 10,000 games for given values of n andm,
then we ran 100,000 games. If statistical significance was still not obtained after 100,000 games, then we
declared a tie. The results from the experiments appear in Table 1.
The results indicate that CFR outperformed FP in two out of the three two-player zero-sum cases
(m = 5, 10), which agrees with the previously described results in two-player zero-sum games and the
claim in prior work that CFR has a stronger theoretical convergence guarantee for two-player zero-sum
games [5]. However, for all other cases (3–5 player and 2-player general-sum) fictitious play outperformed
counterfactual regret minimization (with all but two of the results statistically significant at the 95% con-
fidence level). FP seemed to outperform CFR by more as the number of players increased, with largest
improvement for the 5-player settings.
We next experimented on several games produced from the GAMUT generator [26]. We used the same
games as used in prior work comparing algorithms for multiplayer Nash equilibrium [2]. We used the vari-
ants with 5 players and 3 actions per player (though for two classes we were forced to use 5 actions per
player). As prior work had done, we used 2 for the number of facilities parameter in the congestion game
class, and for the covariant game we used the minimum possible value, which is r = −0.25 for 5 players.
All other parameters were generated randomly (as the prior experiments had done). We generated 1,000
games from each class using these distributions. For several of the games generated some of the payoffs
were “NaN,” and we removed the games in which this occurred. Since the magnitudes of the payoffs varied
widely between game classes, we normalized all payoffs to be in [0,1] before applying the algorithms (by
subtracting the smallest payoff from all the payoffs and then dividing all payoffs by the difference between
the max and min payoff). Note that linear transformations of the payoffs exactly preserve Nash equilibria,
so this normalization would theoretically have no effect on the solutions. For these experiments we used
10,000 iterations of both algorithms. The results are given in Table 2.
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n m # games # iterations Avg. CFR ǫ Avg. FP ǫ Avg. difference in ǫ Winner
2 (zs) 3 10,000 10,000 0.00139 0.00133 5.945 × 10−5 ± 9.511 × 10−6 FP
2 (zs) 5 10,000 10,000 0.00239 0.00261 −2.219 × 10−4 ± 1.550 × 10−5 CFR
2 (zs) 10 10,000 10,000 0.00282 0.00464 −0.0018 ± 2.277 × 10−5 CFR
2 3 10,000 10,000 8.963 × 10−4 8.447 × 10−4 5.155 × 10−5 ± 3.934 × 10−5 FP
2 5 100,000 10,000 0.00383 0.00377 6.000 × 10−5 ± 5.855 × 10−5 FP
2 10 100,000 10,000 0.01249 0.01244 4.865 × 10−5 ± 1.590 × 10−4 Tie
3 3 100,000 10,000 0.00768 0.00749 1.897 × 10−4 ± 1.218 × 10−4 FP
3 5 100,000 10,000 0.02312 0.02244 6.784 × 10−4 ± 2.454 × 10−4 FP
3 10 10,000 10,000 0.05963 0.05574 0.0039 ± 0.0012 FP
4 3 100,000 10,000 0.01951 0.01950 9.798 × 10−6 ± 2.195 × 10−4 Tie
4 5 10,000 10,000 0.05121 0.04635 0.0049 ± 0.0011 FP
4 10 10,000 10,000 0.08315 0.06661 0.0165 ± 8.910 × 10−4 FP
5 3 10,000 10,000 0.13622 0.03285 0.1034 ± 0.0033 FP
5 5 10,000 10,000 0.12286 0.05334 0.0695 ± 0.0022 FP
5 10 10,000 1,000 0.07621 0.04325 0.0330 ± 8.690 × 10−4 FP
Table 1: Results for uniform-random games. First column is number of players n (and whether zero-sum
for n = 2); second column is number of pure strategies per player m; third column is the number of games
generated; fourth column is the number of iterations for CFR and FP; fifth column is average value of ǫ from
CFR; sixth column is average value of ǫ from FP; seventh column is average value of the difference between
CFR ǫ and FP ǫ, with the 95% confidence interval (positive value indicates that FP outperformed CFR, and
negative value that CFR outperformed FP).
Game class m # games Avg. CFR ǫ Avg. FP ǫ Avg. difference in ǫ Winner
Bertrand oligopoly 3 962 0.23165 1.714 × 10−5 0.23164 ± 0.0130 FP
Bidirectional LEG 3 1000 0.32807 3.561 × 10−5 0.32803 ± 0.0232 FP
Collaboration 5 1000 0.00131 4.427 × 10−4 8.627 × 10−4 ± 4.690 × 10−4 FP
Congestion 3 1000 0.32929 2.414 × 10−5 0.32927 ± 0.0233 FP
Covariant 3 1000 0.08872 0.02333 0.06539 ± 0.0061 FP
Polymatrix 3 984 0.06028 6.289 × 10−4 0.05965 ± 0.0076 FP
Random graphical 3 1000 0.13812 0.01582 0.12231 ± 0.0119 FP
Random LEG 3 1000 0.34112 4.103 × 10−4 0.34071 ± 0.0231 FP
Uniform LEG 3 1000 0.33751 2.804 × 10−5 0.33748 ± 0.0228 FP
Table 2: Results for 5-player GAMUT games. For both CFR and FP 10,000 iterations were used. The second
column is the number of actions available per player (we used 3 when it was available, but some game classes
only allowed us to use 5). For each game class we generated 1,000 random games. We ignored the games
where some of the payoffs generated were “NaN,” and report the number of valid games we considered in
the third column. We normalized the payoffs in all games to be in [0,1] to make comparison sensible.
For all game classes fictitious play outperformed counterfactual regret minimization with statistical sig-
nificance. For several of the game classes CFR had an extremely high value of ǫ, while FP had a relatively
small ǫ value for all cases, and extremely small for most.
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